equilibrium, the economy may fluctuate for decades about a level of activity too low to generate full employment because the expected 'normal' rate of interest is too high.
Keynes's policy proposals follow directly from the principle of effective demand. They consist of two suggestions to change the structure of a laissez faire monetary economy.
On the one hand the 'socialization of investment' was a proposal to increase state involvement in economic management with the objective of increasing the expected return on capital (the marginal efficiency of capital) and reducing the risk so as to 'crowdin' private sector investment. These proposals have been well documented by Kregel (1985) and others. On the other hand there was a largely unnoticed proposal that the central bank would have to take control of and lower the expected 'normal' rate of interest.
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The great irony of modern macroeconomics is that despite the rejection of Keynes's theory the structural changes he recommended have indeed been implemented albeit without any grasp of the theoretical foundation on which they were based. Today central banks are indeed under public control and the 'socialization of investment' has become a permanent feature of most western economies, including the United States. The explanation for this apparent paradox was provided by Keynes himself when he observed that once his policy proposals had been implemented some aspects of 'classical' economics would come back into their own. In particular Keynes always stressed the 3 Minsky (1986) had a clear grasp of the intention behind Keynes's policy proposals and Tily (2007) highlights the importance of Keynes's 'cheap money' policy. need for aggregate price stability in a monetary economy once full employment had been achieved. But there are risks for theorists and policy makers who ignore the principle of effective demand and work with the 'classical' special case.
The remainder of this chapter deals with the implications of these developments for the assessment of post Keynesian monetary theory. Section II briefly summarizes Keynes's principle of effective demand as outlined by Dillard (1948) , Kregel (1983) and Rogers (1989) and sketches the limitations of some post Keynesian versions of the principle of effective demand. Part III explains how Keynes's policy proposals follow from his principle of effective demand. Section IV examines recent analysis of interest rate rules using the New Keynesian (NK) and Post Keynesian (PK) models. Section IV assesses these models from the perspective of the principle of effective demand. Section VI concludes that there is still much for monetary theorists to learn from the General Theory.
III Keynes's vs Post Keynesian versions of the principle of effective demand
Pasinetti (1997, p. 93) argues that Keynes never formally stated the principle of effective demand. Thus despite the fact that there was apparently general consensus that the principle of effective demand was the central innovation of the General Theory, there is no agreement on what the principle of effective demand actually is. In what follows it will be demonstrated that there should be no ambiguity and the principle of effective demand rests on the failure of the rate of interest to automatically adjust so that the point of effective demand coincides with full employment, even if wages and prices are flexible in the long run.
Keynes's principle of effective demand is outlined in chapter 3 of the General Theory and can be explained with reference to Figure 1 which also provides a useful comparison with post Keynesian interpretations. The D and Z curves in Figure 1 are as defined by Keynes (1936, chapter 3) and illustrate the Marshallian pedigree of his analysis. 4 The ordinate in Figure 1 measures the aggregate demand and supply prices (ADP & ASP) for various levels of employment for a given technology, state of longterm expectations and a given money wage index. The schedules illustrated in Figure 1 cannot be derived without holding these factors constant.
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This general form of the 'Keynesian Cross' is familiar to most Keynesians but Keynes's Marshallian interpretation and the principle of effective demand has disappeared from sight although Dillard (1948) and later Kregel (1976) provided a comprehensive overview of Keynes's methodology and theory.
The three key independent elements of Keynes's principle of effective demand are; (i) the propensity to consume of less than unity; the expected normal rate of interest behind which lies liquidity preference and banking policy; and (iii) the marginal efficiency of capital. All of these variables are psychological or behavioral and forwardlooking. In . Davidson (2007, appendix to chapter 6) provides a brief explanation of the derivation of the D and Z functions.
As Kregel (1976) in particular, has noted, the General Theory contains a static model that defines this longperiod equilibrium solution given assumptions about expectations and other factors held constant but not fixed reflects that the propensity to consume is less than unity given the expected normal rate of interest and a marginal efficiency of capital.
Figure 1
Keynes's principle of effective demand
Once the expected normal rate of interest 6 is set by the interaction between banking policy and the liquidity preferences of the private sector, at the point of effective demand ED, the marginal efficiency of capital adjusts to the rate of interest to determine long period equilibrium where the D schedule cuts the Z schedule as illustrated in Figure 1 . It 6 There is a selffulfilling prophecy or 'bootstrap' dimension to Keynes's concept of equilibrium as outlined in Rogers (1999) . is then not profitable for firms to expand output beyond the point of effective demand. In terms of Figure 1 , unilateral attempts by entrepreneurs to increase output and employment will depress aggregate demand prices below aggregate supply prices and losses will result. Output and employment will contract back to N 1 . The point of effective demand can be shifted only by changes in one or more of the three independent elements.
In that respect, Keynes identifies three properties of money that prevent the rate of interest from automatically adjusting to restore full employment in the long run.
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Given a banking policy the properties of money interact with liquidity preference to make the rate of interest 'sticky'. In Keynes's opinion there is simply no market mechanism, as postulated by the classical theory, to generate the natural rate of interest such that the point of effective demand automatically coincides with full employment in the long run.
A point of effective determined established by a 'wrong' rate of interest -a rate inconsistent with full employment -is inevitable in a laissez faire monetary economy. Keynes (1936 p. 204) described the position as follows:
"It [the money rate of interest] 8 may fluctuate for decades about a level which is chronically too high for full employment; particularly if it is the prevailing opinion that the rate of interest is selfadjusting, so that the level established by convention is thought to be rooted in objective grounds much stronger that convention, the failure of employment to attain an optimum level being in no way associated, in the minds either of the public or the authority, with the prevalence of an inappropriate range of rates of interest." 7 Dillard (1948, pp. 201204 ) provides a concise discussion of these properties and their implications.
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In this paper the term 'rate of interest' refers to the term structure. Ultimately it is the long rate that determines investment but central banks today have direct control only of the short rate and seek to influence the long term rates indirectly. The technical question of control over long rates is not addressed in this paper. Keynes (1936, chapter 3) makes it abundantly clear that it is the point of effective demand that determines employment, for example, N 1 , and at that level of employment the marginal productivity of labor exceeds the marginal disutility of employment.
By contrast, a common post Keynesian interpretation of Keynes's analysis is represented by Amadeo (1989) who describes the principle of effective demand as the idea that it is changes in the level of income or activity and not the rate of interest that restores equality to saving and investment. This is fine as far as it goes but it leaves the role of rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital unaccounted for in what is usually presented as a shortperiod equilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. Similarly Davidson (2002, p. 22 ) interprets Keynes's (1936 Keynes's ( , p. 2627 ) brief summary presented in chapter 3 of the General Theory to mean that Say's Law is only the view that the aggregate demand and supply relations coincide (the D and Z relations in Figure 1 ).
Davidson then suggests that a propensity to consume of less than unity is sufficient to ensure equilibrium at less than full employment. But Keynes makes it clear in chapter 3 of the General Theory that the propensity to consume of less than unity is only a necessary condition and the rate of interest plays an essential role in determining the point of effective demand. In particular, Keynes (1936, p. 31) makes it clear that the failure of the rate of interest to automatically fall to the level consistent with full employment is to be a key element of his analysis: "…which brings us to the theory of the rate of interest and to the reasons why it does not automatically fall to the appropriate level, which will occupy Book IV". Clearly he intends to restate this position repeatedly in later chapters of the General Theory.
Hence, it is apparent that Davidson (2002) is implicitly assuming something about the behavior of the rate of interest because it is not sufficient to assume a propensity to consume of less than unity to produce Keynes's longperiod unemployment equilibrium.
The fact that the propensity to consume is less than unity is a necessary element of To sum up, recall that in its most general form the principle of effective demand is the idea that the rate of interest sets a limit to the profitable expansion of output before full employment is reached. Thus Say's Law fails, not because the propensity to consume is less than unity, or because changes in income is the mechanism that equates saving and investment, but because there is no market mechanism to select the optimum or the unique natural rate of interest as was the case in the Treatise. In other words, in laissez faire capitalism there is no 'capital' market, no saving and investment schedules, to determine a unique natural Wickselliantype marginal efficiency of capital, r n , towards which the rate of interest, i, will adjust and pull the economy to full employment in the long run.
In a laissez faire economy, the properties of money, banking system conventions and liquidity preference that establish the expected normal interest rate will inevitably be such that marginal efficiency of capital settles at a level which, in Keynes's aggregate Marshallian analysis, the demand prices of capital goods are driven to equality with their longperiod supply prices before full employment is attained as Dillard (1948 ), Kregel (1976 , Rogers (1989) and others have stressed. It is then not profitable for entrepreneurs' to expand output beyond the point of effective demand, unless the expected normal rate of interest falls, for any attempt to do so would involve them in losses by depressing demand prices below longperiod supply prices. As Keynes (1936, p. 31) explains, a limit to the profitable expansion of production and employment can therefore occur even though the marginal product of labor exceeds the marginal disutility of labor -involuntary unemployment exists. A laissez faire economy is one where the government sector is too small a percentage of GDP to significantly influence the economy. Figure 2 arbitrarily selects 10% but a useful discussion of Keynes's analysis of the relevant proportions is provided by Kregel (1985) .
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Tobin is the exception here although he fell back on Wicksell's notion of a unique natural rate consistent with longrun full employment equilibrium. Keynes (1936, p. 252) complained that 'classical' economists often conflated the two and this generated confusion. in which money is neutral in Keynes's analysis as the monetary regime and the behavior of the banking system may be such as to produce a point of effective demand that is inconsistent with full employment. That the behavior of the banking system plays a key role determining the point of effective demand is stated explicitly by Keynes (1979, p.55) Lying behind this view is Keynes's (1936, p. 351) conviction that the rate of interest is not selfadjusting to a level consistent with the social advantage but had a tendency, if unrestrained, to rise too high.
14 Keynes (936, p. 352 ) was critical of classical theory for often conflating the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital. In an early draft of the General Theory he included the distinction between the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital in his equations. See Keynes (1973, Part I p.483 for decades about such longperiod equilibria. The principle of effective demand provides the theoretical framework for that opinion and clearly the General Theory is not just another model of the business cycle, as many Keynesians believe, but a theory that identifies a structural failure inherent in laissezfaire capitalism. In Keynes's view, failure of the rate of interest to find its unique Wicksellian optimal or natural rate, r n , at full employment was inevitable in a laissez faire economy. In such a system equilibrium at full employment would be an accident.
III
Policy implications of the principle of effective demand: socialization of investment and public control of the green cheese factory
Keynes's policy recommendations now follow from his theory. On the fiscal side, the 'socialization of investment' aims to stabilize aggregate demand and lift the rate of return on private sector investment. On the monetary side, public control of the central bank is necessary to lower the expected normal rate of interest. Monetary management cannot be avoided and there is no alternative but to convince the public that the central bank can manage the monetary system so as to produce a lower expected 'normal' rate of interest.
This proposal is mentioned only briefly in the General Theory when Keynes (1936, p. 235) makes an enigmatic reference to the green cheese factory.
"Unemployment develops, that is to say, because people want the moon; men cannot be employed when the object they desire (i.e. money) is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off. There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same thing and to have a green cheese factory [i.e. a central bank] under public control."
These two policy proposals are complementary. The 'socialization of investment' was essential because without it the variation in the marginal efficiency of capital would be too great to be offset by movements in the rate of interest. The 'socialization of investment' proposed by Keynes was thus intended to achieve two objectives; (i) increase the size of government as a proportion of GDP so that it was large enough relative to GDP to stabilize aggregate demand, and (ii) undertake infrastructure investment on a long view and in the public interest so as to 'crowdin' private sector investment. Details of Keynes's proposals are discussed by Kregel (1985) and Rogers (2006b (2006) and is not of major concern here. From the perspective of this paper the key issue is the The need for a managed currency is not an innovation of the General Theory. As Bibow (2000b) explains, Keynes had already reached that conclusion in the Tract. In the Treatise Keynes thought that monetary management could guide the system to its unique natural rate of interest consistent with full employment. What changes in the General Theory is the absence of a unique natural rate so the market rate set by the banking policy and liquidity preference determines longperiod equilibrium. The central bank sets a nominal rate but if it follows the Taylor Principle and adjusts the nominal rate more than the expected rate of inflation the real (=inflation adjusted) rate will change with changes in the nominal instrument. 
A baseline PK model; nonneutral endogenous money
Setterfield (2003) also presents a PK model that exhibits longrun nonneutral money. In that respect it is in the tradition of the General Theory. How the two are related will be examined in the next section. Here we concentrate on teasing out the properties and implications of the model.
The corresponding three equations for the PK model are listed below as equation (2.6) to (2.8).
where Z is a vector of institutional variables the effect aggregate wage and price setting behavior, 1 0 < <φ and the other variables are as defined for the NK model. The PK model differs from the NK model by the absence of an exogenous natural rate of growth, n g , the fact that the equilibrium rate of growth is demand constrained so monetary policy is never neutral, and there is scope for an autonomous changes in the wage bargaining process to impact on inflation through Z in equation (2.6). These features of the model mean that the longrun Phillips Curve is not vertical. The Phillips
Curve in the PK model is derived by imposing the condition for stationary inflation
The equilibrium solution to the model is derived from the condition where steady inflation occurs at the target rate
. In that case the equilibrium real interest rate is * 1 r r r t = = − from the interest rate rule, equation (2.8), and from the Phillips Curve, equation (2.7), the equilibrium real rate of growth is:
Substituting the IStype relationship,
, into (2.9) produces the expression for the equilibrium real rate of interest to be set by the central bank, given its inflation target,
Expression (2.10) reveals that the equilibrium real interest rate set by the central bank is a positive function of the autonomous growth element, and hence fiscal policy, the wage and price setting arrangements and a negative function of the target rate of inflation. This relationship means that the lower the inflation target the higher the equilibrium real rate of interest and the higher the equilibrium real rate of interest the lower the equilibrium growth rate. Longrun neutrality is lost as the equilibrium growth rate is a function of the inflation target.
IV Assessment of post Keynesian monetary economics
The longrun nonneutrality of money in the PK model is a step towards Keynes's principle of effective demand. But it doesn't quite go far enough.
Consider, first, the role of the fiscal regime in the PK model sketched above. Recall that the fiscal regime is embedded in the autonomous component of growth 0 g . Examination of the model and the role of fiscal regime reveal that it exhibits complete crowding out.
There are two effects at work; one operates directly to shift the IStype relationship irrespective of the real rate of interest, as indicated by equation (2.6) and one which operates to increase the equilibrium real rate of interest, * r as indicated by expression (2.10). In other words we have we can see that the net effect is zero as
. There is complete long run crowdingout of fiscal policy.
This result follows from the absence of the principle of effective demand -specifically, the absence of the distinction between the rate of interest and marginal efficiency of capital. In Keynesian models with a single rate of interest the principle of effective demand inevitably disappears.
To reinterpret the PK model from Keynes's perspective it is necessary to introduce the distinction between the rate of interest controlled by the central bank and the marginal efficiency of capital. In models that fail to distinguish between the cost and return on capital changes in fiscal policy appear as changes in the cost of capital when the objective of fiscal policy should be to increase the return on capital relative to the cost. Formally we get the following results:
Although parsimonious the model in (2.6')-(28') captures the consequences of the principle of effective demand and allows for a simple illustration of Keynes's policy proposals -a fiscal regime to increase the return on capital and a central bank in control of the rate of interest. The equilibrium growth rate generated by the model is then dependent on the rate of interest set by the central bank once the inflation target has been set. A low inflation target means a higher equilibrium interest rate and lower real growth rate. Moreover, there is nothing in the model to ensure that the rate of interest produced by (2.8') will produce n g g = . However, it is possible for a change in fiscal regime to lift growth by lifting the return on capital without any impact on the rate of interest. The distinction between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest is necessary to see that an increase in the marginal efficiency of capital is not the same thing as an increase in the real rate of interest. This is an elementary point but one that is often overlooked.
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An increase in the marginal efficiency of capital will lead to an increase in capacity if the rate of interest is not increased. Crowding out is not inevitable as was the case in models that don't distinguish between i and r, i.e., the vast majority of Keynesian models. In a growing economy it is the case that r i < so investment is positive and the capital stock is growing. as the gold standard, or targeting monetary aggregates, leaves the rate of interest to be determined by the international markets and the liquidity preferences of the private sector. The conventions that guide the implementation of monetary policy will then produce a rate of interest determined by the private sector but there is no reason why that rate should produce a point of effective demand consistent with full employment.
The consequences of such monetary policy regimes depend on the associated fiscal regime. If government has expanded its role to underpin aggregate demand and the rate of return on capital, something which is taken for granted in most economies these days, the suboptimal performance of the economy may well be limited. The major structural change that occurred to western economies in the post war period was a structural adjustment of this sort. It has been noted in the literature that the increased role for government in macroeconomic management and the associated increased size of the government component of GDP contributes to stability. Without the fiscal regime change the consequences of an inappropriate monetary regime could be more serious.
Seen from this perspective it is apparent most modern economies have adopted Keynes On the fiscal side, the absence of any coherent Eurowide fiscal policy in principle leaves the marginal efficiency of capital to luck and the 'animal spirits' of the private sector. In practice the matter may be less serious as tax and other policies are coordinated across Europe and tacit violation of the Stability Pact targets by national governments is allowed. On the monetary front the low level and asymmetrical nature of the inflation target set by the ECB creates selfinflicted credibility problems, and imparts an upward bias to interest rates that is widely perceived as a constraint on growth. Bibow (2005) likens it to driving a Ferrari with a foot permanently on the brake. From the perspective of the principle of effective demand it is apparent that the ECB strategy forces up the expected normal rate of interest producing a point of effective demand that inhibits growth in the absence of a buoyant marginal efficiency of capital.
As Bibow (2005) also explains, the dual objectives of price stability and high employment required by the Treaty on European Union have been conflated by the ECB into the single objective of price stability. What is more ironic, the ECB has been cut free from public control in the name of central bank independence! The rationale provided by the ECB for this monetary strategy is the argument that price stability is sufficient to achieve full employment and slow growth in the Eurozone is due to rigidities in labor markets. Clearly, the wheel has come full circle here to Keynes's debate with the classics. 
